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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Robeson Industries Corp. appeals from the decision of 
the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey affirming the bankruptcy court's grant of summary 
judgment that Robeson was not entitled to coverage under 
its insurance policies and could not prevail in its tort 
claims against the insurers. Robeson also appeals from the 
decision of the district court denying jurisdiction to review 
the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions under 
Bankruptcy Rule 9011. See Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Zurich 
Ins. Co., Civ. No. 97-5158(GEB) (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 1998) 





This appeal arises out of an adversary proceeding 
commenced by debtor Robeson in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. In that 
proceeding, Robeson contended that Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., Zurich Insurance Co., and Continental 
Insurance Co. (the "Insurers") had a duty to defend and 
indemnify it against claims arising from the discharge of 
certain contaminants at its manufacturing facility in 
Castile, New York, including a claim brought by the New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation in 
1990.1 Robeson had purchased various commercial general 
liability insurance policies from the Insurers that provided 
coverage from 1976 to 1983. The policies were negotiated in 
New York and were issued to Robeson at its headquarters 
in Mineola, New York. Although the policies were 
apparently not identical as to the property covered, see 
Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Zurich Ins. Co., Bankr. No. 93- 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In addition, a private claim was later filed after the commencement of 
the bankruptcy proceeding by an adjacent landowner. See Robeson 
Indus. Corp. v. Zurich Ins. Co., Bankr. No. 93-33265(KCF), at 3 (Bankr. 
D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1997) (memorandum opinion). 
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33265(KCF), at 4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1997) 
(memorandum opinion), they all pertained generally to 
Robeson's New York property, including the Castile facility. 
None of the policies contained a choice-of-law provision. 
 
The policies contained two provisions relevant to the 
present controversy. The first provision obligated Robeson 
to give prompt notice to the Insurers of any occurrence or 
third-party claim covered by the policies (the "late notice" 
provision).2 The parties do not dispute that the states of 
New York and New Jersey differ in their interpretation of 
the "late notice" provision. Under New York law, an 
insured's breach of the timely notice provision relieves the 
insurer of its duty to defend or indemnify, even absent a 
showing of prejudice to the insured. See Unigard Sec. Ins. 
Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 594 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1992). 
In contrast, under New Jersey law, an insurer mustfirst 
establish prejudice before untimely notice relieves the 
insurer of its duties under the policy. See Cooper v. 
Government Employees Ins. Co., 237 A.2d 870, 874 (N.J. 
1968). 
 
The second policy provision generally excludes coverage 
for environmental contamination, except for contamination 
that was "sudden and accidental" (the "pollution exclusion" 
exception). Although Robeson argued to the bankruptcy 
court that no conflict of law existed between New York and 
New Jersey on the interpretation of the "pollution 
exclusion" exception, the court disagreed, noting that New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What we refer to as the "late notice" provision is actually two 
separate 
provisions in the policies that cover different circumstances, both of 
which were implicated in this case. The first provision states: "If a 
claim 
is made or suit is brought against insured, the insured shall immediately 
forward to the company every demand, notice, summons or other 
process received by him or his representative." See Robeson Indus. Corp. 
v. Zurich Ins. Co., Bankr. No. 93-33265(KCF), at 3 (Bankr. D.N.J. Aug. 
27, 1997) (memorandum opinion) (emphasis added). The second 
provision states: "In the event of an occurrence, written notice 
containing 
particulars sufficient to identify the insured and also reasonably 
obtainable information with respect to the time, place and circumstances 
thereof, and the names and addresses of available witnesses, shall be 
given by or for the insured to the company, or any of its authorized 
agents as soon as practicable." Id. (emphasis added). 
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Jersey interprets the "sudden and accidental" language to 
cover gradual discharges, see Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General 
Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 870-75 (N.J. 1993), 
whereas New York interprets this language as covering only 
abrupt discharges, see Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. 
Co., 548 N.E.2d 1301, 1302 (N.Y. 1989). See also Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 712 A.2d 634, 640-41, 
643-44 (N.J. 1998) (summarizing the differences between 
New York's and New Jersey's interpretations of the"late 
notice" provision and the "pollution exclusion" exception). 
 
The interpretations to be given to the "late notice" 
provision and the "pollution exclusion" exception are 
outcome-determinative in this case. Robeson did not timely 
notify the Insurers of their potential liability under the 
policies until December 1992, two-and-a-half years after 
the State of New York filed its claim against Robeson and 
several years after the contamination began. Moreover, 
Robeson's contamination was gradual, ostensibly occurring 
over several years. Robeson thus contended in the 
Bankruptcy court that New Jersey law applied to the 
interpretation of the policies. Robeson's main argument in 
support of its contention was that it had moved its 
headquarters to South Plainfield, New Jersey in April 1991.3 
Robeson further argued, in an attempt to show its close ties 
to New Jersey, that it had been using warehousing facilities 
in New Jersey for approximately the last twenty years, paid 
New Jersey taxes thereon, and had continually maintained 
management personnel and sales representatives in New 
Jersey. 
 
The bankruptcy court, applying New Jersey choice-of-law 
rules, found Robeson's argument in favor of the application 
of New Jersey law unpersuasive, and held on summary 
judgment that New York law applied to the interpretation of 
the policy exclusions. See Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Zurich 
Ins. Co., Bankr. No. 93-33265(KCF), at 17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
Jan. 24, 1997). The court later granted summary judgment 
of non-coverage to the Insurers. See id. at 2-8 (Bankr. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. At some time prior to its filing of the instant suit, Robeson moved its 
headquarters again from New Jersey to California. See Robeson's Brief, 
at 8 n.9. 
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D.N.J. Aug. 27, 1997). The court also clarified that its 
choice-of-law ruling also applied to Robeson's tort claims 
against the Insurers--claims stemming largely from the 
Insurers' alleged bad faith with respect to the denial of 
coverage. Finding such claims to be unsustainable under 
New York law, the court granted summary judgment to the 
Insurers on the tort claims as well. See id. at 8-12. The 
district court summarily affirmed the bankruptcy court's 
summary judgment rulings on appeal. See Robeson Indus. 
Corp. v. Zurich Ins. Co., Civ. No. 97-5158(GEB) (D.N.J. Feb. 
20, 1998). 
 
In its summary judgment opinion, the bankruptcy court 
invited the Insurers to move for sanctions under 
Bankruptcy Rule 90114 because of Robeson's dogged 
insistence that New Jersey law or policy should apply even 
in the face of the court's earlier choice-of-law ruling and 
New York law directly on point. The Insurers accepted this 
invitation, and, not surprisingly, the bankruptcy court 
granted the resulting motion,5 awarding the Insurers their 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Bankruptcy Rule 9011 is similar to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. It states in relevant part: 
 
       (b) Representations to the court--By presenting to the court 
       (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a 
       petition, pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or 
       unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's 
       knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
       reasonable under the circumstances--(1) it is not being presented 
       for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
       unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) 
       the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are 
       warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the 
       extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
       establishment of new law[.] 
 
Subsection (c) provides for the imposition of sanctions for the breach of 
a party's Rule 9011 obligations. 
5. The bankruptcy court stated: "This court determined on January 27, 
1997 that under New Jersey choice of law rules . . . New York law 
applied. From January 27, 1997 to August 27, 1997, the plaintiff in an 
overly zealous manner created expense to the defendants on related 
issues without presenting [a] consistent theory or a good faith argument 
for reversing existing [law]. [Robeson's] briefs were duplicative, 
circulative, voluminous, self-righteous and full of[citations to] self- 
serving publication[s] which it authored." See Robeson Indus. Corp. v. 
Zurich Ins. Co., Bankr. No. 93-33256(KCF), at 2 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 11, 
1998) (memorandum opinion). 
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litigation expenses for the time period between the court's 
choice-of-law ruling and its grant of summary judgment. 
 
Robeson appealed the imposition of sanctions to the 
district court, but the court dismissed the appeal on the 
ground that it had not been filed within the ten-day time 
limit prescribed by Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a). The district 
court noted that the bankruptcy court signed its sanctions 
order on February 11, 1998, that the order was entered on 
the clerk's docket on February 23, 1998, and that the ten- 
day period began to run on this latter date. Because 
Robeson's notice of appeal was filed on March 6, the 
district court continued, it was one day late and therefore 
the court lacked jurisdiction. See Robeson Indus. Corp. v. 
Zurich Ins. Co., Civ. No. 97-5158(GEB) (D.N.J. Jun. 1, 1998) 
(hearing transcript). Ruling in the alternative, the district 
court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court to 
impose sanctions on the merits. See id. 
 
Robeson appealed the summary judgment rulings and 
the sanctions order to this court. We have jurisdiction 




A. Standards of Review 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). This court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment de novo, reapplying the summary judgment 
standard. See General Ceramics, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. 
Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3rd Cir. 1995). Choice-of-law is a 
question of law which this court reviews de novo . See id. 
Whether an appeal from the bankruptcy court to the 
district court is timely is also a question of law which this 
court reviews de novo. See Shareholders v. Sound Radio, 
Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3rd. Cir. 1997). Because we sit in 
diversity in the present case, we are bound to follow the 
substantive law of the forum, see Clark v. Modern Group, 
Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3rd Cir. 1994), including the forum's 
choice-of-law rules, see Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 
U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
 




The Supreme Court of New Jersey has in several cases 
set forth New Jersey's choice-of-law rules for the 
interpretation of casualty insurance contracts. See, e.g., 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 712 A.2d 634 (N.J. 
1998); HM Holdings, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 712 A.2d 
645 (N.J. 1998) (decided concurrently with Pfizer); Unisys 
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 712 A.2d 649 (N.J. 1998) 
(decided concurrently with Pfizer); The Gilbert Spruance Co. 
v. Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885 (N.J. 
1993). See also General Ceramics, supra. These cases make 
clear that New Jersey follows S 193 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.6 Pfizer, "applying the 
principles" laid down in the Court's earlier opinion in 
Spruance, sets forth the operative portions of that 
provision: 
 
       Spruance set forth a specific choice-of-law framework 
       for interpreting casualty-insurance contracts. Under 
       this framework, a court looks first to Restatement 
       section 193, which provides that the place that"the 
       parties understood . . . to be the principal location of 
       the insured risk governs unless some other state has a 
       more significant relationship under the principles 
       stated in S 6 to the transaction and the parties." 
 
Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 638 (citation deleted). Thus, under S 193 
of the Restatement, New Jersey generally interprets 
casualty-insurance policies in accordance with the law of 
the state in which the insured risk is principally located, 
unless some other state has a more significant relationship 
to the transaction and the parties as illuminated by the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The validity of a contract of fire, surety or casualty insurance and 
       the rights created thereby are determined by the local law of the 
       state which the parties understood was to be the principal location 
       of the insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with 
respect 
       to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant 
       relationship under the principles stated in S 6 to the transaction 
and 
       the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will 
be 
       applied. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law S 193 (1969). 
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consideration of factors listed in S 6.7 The Court has 
referred to the approach under S 193 as "site-specific." See 
Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 637. 
 
However, not every application of S 193 necessitates 
review of the S 6 factors. Indeed, rote application of the S 6 
factors would swallow the "site-specific" rule that S 193 
prescribes. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has 
recognized as much: 
 
       When the policy covers risks located primarily in a 
       single state, the choice-of-law issue can be 
       straightforward. For example, there is no choice-of-law 
       issue where the policyholder is located in one state, the 
       environmental liability arises out of the same state, 
       and the policies are issued by a state-based insurer for 
       that one site. An easy example is that of a [commercial 
       general liability] policy covering a solid waste treatment 
       plant creating a risk in a single state. At the other end 
       of the spectrum are cases where a single insured seeks 
       coverage under [commercial general liability] policies 
       for certain environmental and toxic tort liabilities, 
       including . . . [multiple] sites located in . . . different 
       states. When such an insured operation or activity is 
       predictably multistate, the significance of the principal 
       location of the insured risk diminishes; in such a case, 
       section 193 directs that the governing law is that of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. [T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law 
       include (a) the needs of the interstate and international system, 
(b) 
       the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of 
other 
       affected states and the relevant interests of those states in the 
       determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of 
justified 
       expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular 
field of 
       law, (f) certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease 
       in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws S 6 (1969). 
 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, following Ceramics, collapsed these 
factors into four "categories" for purposes of application: (1) the 
competing interests of the relevant states, (2) the national interests of 
commerce among several states, (3) the interests of the parties in 
realizing justified expectations and achieving predictable results, and 
(4) 
the interests of judicial administration. See Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 639-40. 
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       state with the dominant significant relationship 
       according to the principles set forth in Restatement 
       section 6 as applied to the particular issue involved. 
 
Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 638 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Therefore, a court need only consider the application of the 
S 6 factors when the "insured operation or activity is 
predictably multistate," that is, when the policy covers sites 
in many states, or when the insured risk is transient. See 
id. at 639 (noting that the insured risk was"to some degree 
transient," and therefore "to choose the applicable law that 
governs the disputed issues, Spruance requires that we 
turn to the S 6 analysis."). The comments to S 193 confirm 
this interpretation: 
 
       The location of the insured risk will be given greater 
       weight than any other single contact in determining the 
       state of the applicable law provided that the risk can be 
       located, at least principally, in a single state. Situations 
       where this cannot be done, and where the location of 
       the risk has less significance, include (1) where the 
       insured object will be more or less constantly on the 
       move from state to state during the terms of the policy 
       and (2) where the policy covers a group of risks that 
       are scattered throughout two or more states. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws S 193 cmt. b 
(1969). 
 
Robeson's principal argument is that HM Holdings , a case 
decided concurrently with Pfizer, mandates that New Jersey 
law applies in this case, at least with respect to the 
interpretation of the "late notice" provision. Robeson asserts 
that that case is "remarkably similar" to the facts presented 
here. We disagree. Like Pfizer, Unisys, Spruance, and 
General Ceramics, HM Holdings involved a "predictably 
multistate" insured operation, which consequently 
necessitated a S 6 inquiry on its particular facts. 
Specifically, HM Holdings involved coverage under a 
commercial general liability policy of nine waste sites 
located within seven different states. See HM Holdings, 712 
A.2d at 211-12. The Court concluded under S 6 that the law 
of the waste sites would apply to the interpretation of the 
"pollution exclusion" exception, and that either the law of 
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New Jersey or the law of the waste sites applied to the "late 
notice" provision, with New Jersey law taking precedence if 
the law of the waste sites was similar to New York's, the 
state in which the parties were headquartered. See id. at 
648-49. 
 
In contrast, Robeson's insured activities were not 
"predictably multistate," and they thus fit within the 
general site-specific rule of S 193. The policies involved 
covered only Robeson's New York property, and only New 
York was implicated by Robeson's contamination. Compare 
Spruance, 629 A.2d at 885 (involving the hauling of waste 
from Pennsylvania to New Jersey). These facts alone are 
dispositive under S 193 because the parties at the time of 
contracting clearly understood New York (more specifically, 
Robeson's plant in Castile) to be the principal location of 
the insured risk. In fact, the facts of this case, viz., "a 
commercial general liability policy covering a . . . plant 
creating a risk in a single state," were described by the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey as an "easy example" that 
presents "no choice-of-law issue" and no need for a complex 
balancing of factors under S 6. See Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 638; 
cf. Spruance, 629 A.2d at 891 ("When the waste producing 
facility and the waste site are located in the same state, 
their common location makes the application of section 193 
straightforward.").8 
 
Robeson's argument concerning the movement of its 
headquarters to New Jersey does not alter the result to 
which S 193 directs us. First, the site-specific rule 
prescribed by that section is unaffected by the location of 
the contracting parties' headquarters; the focus is the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The bankruptcy court was also aware that "[t]he instant case 
represents the hypothetical `straightforward' case suggested by the court 
in [Spruance] because the insured risk was not transient and was not 
scattered through several states." See Robeson Indus. Corp. v. Zurich Ins. 
Co., Bankr. No. 93-33265(KCF), at 10 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 24, 1997) 
(memorandum opinion). Despite the bankruptcy court's recognition of 
this fact, and its proper conclusion based thereon that New York law 
should apply to the interpretation of the policies, the court went on to 
balance the various states' interests under S 6. While we consider this 
extra step unnecessary under S 193, we believe that it helped to 
underscore the bankruptcy court's conclusion. 
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parties' understanding of the location of the insured risk.9 
Second, S 193 prescribes that it is the parties' 
understanding of the principal location of the insured risk 
"during the term of the policy" that matters. Thus, the 
movement of Robeson's headquarters to New Jersey seven 
years after the expiration of the last of the policies at issue 
cannot have affected the parties' understanding at the time 
of contracting that New York was the principal location of 
the insured risk. Robeson's other contacts with New Jersey 
likewise do not affect the analysis under S 193. 
 
We conclude that the district court correctly affirmed the 
bankruptcy court's application of New Jersey choice-of-law 
rules and correctly affirmed the application of New York law 
to the interpretation of the policies. Because Robeson does 
not dispute that it is not entitled to coverage under the 
laws of New York, the district court's affirmance of the 
bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment to the 
Insurers is also affirmed. 
 
C. The Tort Claims 
 
Robeson argues that the bankruptcy court improperly 
applied New York law to its tort claims. Robeson asserts 
that its tort claims are independent of its claim for coverage 
under the policy, and that New Jersey choice-of-law rules 
mandate that New Jersey law should apply to those claims. 
Robeson supports this assertion by noting that its various 
tort claims,10 which it summarizes generally as the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We do not mean to suggest that the location of a party's headquarters 
is irrelevant in a "multistate activity" case--i.e., when a weighing of 
the 
S 6 factors is warranted under S 193, see, e.g., Pfizer, 712 A.2d at 641 
(assessing the relevance of New York law in a multistate site case 
because New York was the principal place of business of the insured and 
was the location in which the contracts were negotiated), but this is not 
such a case. 
 
10. The relevant tort claims are styled in Robeson's complaint as "breach 
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing,""failure to warn," and "breach 
of fiduciary duty." See Robeson's Complaint at 15, 17, 22. Review of 
these claims reveals, as Robeson admits, that the claims are premised 
upon the Insurers' alleged bad faith in the handling of Robeson's claims. 
Thus, we will refer to Robeson's various tort claims as a single claim for 
bad faith. 
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Insurers' "bad-faith claims handling and investigation of 
Robeson's claims in connection with the Castile facility," 
Robeson's Opening Brief at 18, all took place after Robeson 
had moved its headquarters to New Jersey and therefore 
that the state of New York has no relevant interest in the 
controversy. Robeson argues further that New Jersey law 
allows for the imposition of tort liability against an insurer 
for bad faith even when the insured was not entitled to 
coverage under the policy, and cites several cases from 
various state supreme courts in support of this contention. 
The Insurers respond that the same state's law--New York's 
--should apply to both Robeson's coverage and bad faith 
claims because the bad faith claims merely arise out of 
alleged unsatisfactory performance by the Insurers under 
the policy. Accordingly, the Insurers contend that New York 
law applies to the propriety of the bad faith claims, and 
that such claims are unsustainable thereunder. 
 
We do not necessarily agree with the bankruptcy court's 
conclusion that the same state's law necessarily applies to 
the coverage and bad faith claims. The appellate courts of 
New Jersey have explained that 
 
       conflict of laws principles do not require that all legal 
       issues presented by a single case be decided under the 
       law of a single state. Instead the choice of law decisions 
       can and should be made on an issue-by-issue basis, 
       and thus the law of different states can apply to 
       different issues in the same case. 
 
O'Connor v. Busch Gardens, 605 A.2d 773, 774 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1992) (citing Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 367, 375 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991)). Therefore, a separate analysis 
to determine which state's law applies to Robeson's bad 
faith claim would normally be appropriate. 
 
However, application of New Jersey's conflict-of-law rules 
is unnecessary here because neither New Jersey nor New 
York would sustain Robeson's tort claims. In New York 
University v. Continental Insurance Co., 662 N.E.2d 763 
(N.Y. 1995), the Court of Appeals of New York dismissed a 
claim analogous to Robeson's, namely, that the insurer had 
negligently and recklessly failed to adequately investigate 
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the insured's claim and denied payment. See New York 
Univ., 662 N.E.2d at 769-70. The Court of Appeals began 
its analysis by noting that insurance policies, like other 
contracts, contain an implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. See id. at 769. In order to sustain an action for tort 
liability against an insurer, as opposed to an action for 
breach of contract, the insured's complaint must assert a 
basis for tort liability that goes beyond the breach of the 
insurer's contractual duties. See id. at 770 (noting that the 
insured's complaint must state a "tort independent of the 
contract"). The Court of Appeals concluded that 
 
       Plaintiff's claim amounts to nothing more than a claim 
       based on the alleged breach of the implied covenant of 
       good faith and fair dealing, and the use of familiar tort 
       language does not change the cause of action to a tort 
       claim in the absence of an underlying tort duty 
       sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. 
 
       The cause of action is duplicative of the . . . cause of 
       action for breach of contract and should have been 
       dismissed. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). Because Robeson's tort claims in 
essence allege no more than that the Insurers engaged in 
bad faith in their performance of their duties under the 
policy, New York law mandates their dismissal. 
 
Robeson's bad faith claim does not fare any better under 
New Jersey law. In Pickett v. Lloyd's, 621 A.2d 445 (N.J. 
1993), the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that 
"there is a sufficient basis in law to find that an insurance 
company owes a duty of good faith to its insured in 
processing a first-party11 claim," a conclusion which rested 
largely on the understanding that contracts generally 
contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. See 
Pickett, 621 A.2d at 540. After extensive analysis of the 
authorities, the Court concluded that the cause of action 
for bad faith is "best understood as one that sounds in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Both New York University and Pickett involve first-party claims. 
However, we see no reason why the rationales of these cases should not 
likewise apply in the third-party context, i.e., when the policy covers 
damage to a third party's property. 
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contract," id. at 452, and that contract damages were the 
appropriate remedy for breach, see id. at 454. The Court 
continued that whether bad faith exists depends on 
whether the insured's claim was "fairly debatable." Id. at 
453. In other words, the insured must "show the absence 
of a reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy and 
the defendant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack 
of a reasonable basis for denying the claim." Id. In defining 
the scope of what claims are "fairly debatable," the Court 
noted the following: 
 
       Perhaps the [fairly debatable] rule is easiest to 
       understand in the context of the denial of benefits on 
       the basis of non-coverage . . . . Under the "fairly 
       debatable" standard, a claimant who could not have 
       established as a matter of law a right to summary 
       judgment on the substantive claim would not be 
       entitled to assert a claim for an insurer's bad faith 
       refusal to pay the claim. 
 
Id. at 453-54 (citations omitted). 
 
Here, Robeson did not establish a right to summary 
judgment that there was coverage. In fact, summary 
judgment was decided in favor of the Insurers , a ruling 
which we have affirmed as correct. Accordingly, the 
Insurers did not act in "bad faith" as a matter of New 
Jersey law. 
 
Because the application of the laws of New York or New 
Jersey to Robeson's tort claims would lead to the same 
conclusion--i.e., dismissal--there is no need for us to 
embark upon a choice-of-law analysis with respect thereto. 
Instead, we agree with the bankruptcy court and the 
district court that these claims were not sustainable in 
either jurisdiction, and we affirm the grant of summary 




Robeson's final argument is that its appeal of the 
bankruptcy court's sanctions order to the district court was 
not untimely under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a). In support of 
its argument, Robeson contends that the ten-day time 
period of Rule 8002(a) did not begin to run until the district 
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court had finally disposed of Robeson's earlier appeal on 
the merits of coverage and tort liability on February 24, 
1998.12 As Robeson's appeal of the sanctions order was filed 
on March 6, 1998, within 10 days of February 24th, 
Robeson contends that its appeal was timely filed. 
 
We disagree. Rule 8002(a) states that "[t]he notice of 
appeal shall be filed with the clerk within 10 days of the 
date of the entry of the judgment, order, or decree appealed 
from." This court has noted that "[t]his deadline is strictly 
construed. The failure to file a timely notice of appeal 
creates a jurisdictional defect barring appellate review." 
Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3rd 
Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The rule clearly defines the 
act that starts the running of the appeal period--viz., entry 
of the order in the bankruptcy court. The rule makes no 
exception for the circumstance that a party has taken an 
appeal to the district court on the merits of the case or on 
a separate issue presented in the same controversy. 
Furthermore, we perceive no reason that such an exception 
is warranted, and in any event it would not be consistent 
with the "strict construction" that we are required to afford 
to the rule. Accordingly, we agree with the district court 
that Robeson's appeal of the sanctions order was not timely 
and that the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to 
review that order. Given our affirmance on jurisdictional 
grounds, we express no opinion on the district court's 
conclusion that the sanctions order was otherwise 
affirmable on its merits. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Appellee Zurich appears to have misunderstood Robeson's argument, 
for it discusses the relevance of the fact that the district court had 
stayed its sanctions order pending resolution of Robeson's earlier appeal 
on the merits of coverage and tort liability. However, Robeson clearly 
articulates its argument in its opening brief: "The relevant issue before 
this Court is whether an appeal of sanction may proceed in the absence 
of a final adjudication of an action, not whether a court's entry of a 
stay 
of its own sanctions order tolls the time to file a notice of appeal from 
the Order." Robeson's Opening Brief, at 43 (emphasis in original). Given 
the clarity of Robeson's argument, there is no reason for us to consider 
the relevance of the district court's stay. 
 




The district court did not err in (1) affirming the 
bankruptcy court's conclusion that New York law applied to 
the interpretation of the insurance policies at issue and 
that Robeson was not entitled to coverage thereunder, (2) 
affirming the bankruptcy court's conclusion that Robeson's 
tort claims were unsustainable, or (3) dismissing Robeson's 
appeal on the issue of sanctions for lack of jurisdiction. 
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